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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the growing national security threat posed by
Russia and China’s willingness to exercise 21st century information warfare techniques against
the United States and its areas of strategic interest. This study will describe the composition of
these state’s foreign disinformation entities while providing several case studies that display their
advanced capabilities and the direct effects that each poses on the general public both
domestically and internationally. To best provide unbiased reporting and accuracy in each
country’s analysis, this study will rely on the diversified use of government reports, legal
documents, academic journals, and news articles. After research into each state, this study will
conclude with several recommendations for President-elect Joe Biden and his administration.
Ultimately this study will advance the belief that as the United States changes administration, it
remains imperative that the federal government acknowledges the growing threat of international
adversaries that actively target our democracy and act proactively in defensive and offensive
measures.
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Introduction and Overview
Disinformation (n.): false information deliberately and often covertly spread (as by the planting
of rumors) in order to influence public opinion or obscure the truth.1
-

Merriam Webster’s Dictionary

The democratic system within the United States has thrived thanks to the trust that the
American voters bestow upon the electoral system. However, in light of events over the past
decade, we have been witness to the degradation of a fair and just system. Moreover, we have
become unknowing actors in the complex decades-long rivalry between international
superpowers — the United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the People's Republic
of China. Reflecting on the events of the 2016 Presidential Election in the United States, millions
of American voters became blind victims and aided in carrying out the spread of disinformation
that originated from the increasingly aggressive international adversaries, who have fueled
criticism of the United States and its democratic system. Are Russia and China to blame for the
growing skepticism surrounding the purity and functionality of our system, and are we serving as
unwitting enablers in advancing the impact of related disinformation campaigns?
In the past two decades, we have seen the rise of technology giants, such as Facebook,
Instagram, and Twitter that have driven a sense of a virtual mutual community among users
across the globe through social media platforms. However, the rise of these platforms has
adversely affected the traditional means by which individuals connect with each other, become
informed, and formulate their opinions on current events. The Pew Research Center, a
Washington D.C.-based nonpartisan think tank, reported in 2016 that 62% of U.S. adults
received their news from social media, with 64% of these individuals only getting news from one
“Definition of Disinformation,” Merriam-webster.com (Merriam-Webster, 2019),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disinformation.
1
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given social media platform.2 The growing reliance on social media has directly affected the
news industry, as early to middle stage media outlets are being forced to shut down or merge
with the big-name networks that control the industry.3 As we see titans of the industry, such as
CNN or Fox News, relentlessly strive to extend their brands’ reach across these platforms, we
have seen a rise in subjective reporting. These outlets deviate from the traditional nonpartisan
and objective reporting strategy, thus creating a population of users that are increasingly
polarized.

President Obama and Social Media Campaigning
Beginning in 2008, Barack Obama as a Presidential candidate paved the way for
implementing social media strategy into politics. According to the Pew Internet and American
Life Project, 2008 was the first year “that more than half [of] the voting-age population used the
internet to connect to the political process during an election cycle.”4 While the study shows that
Republican voters were more likely to be users of the internet due to education and income
levels, the Obama voters had cultivated the concept of online political activism.5 The 2008
election had figuratively opened the floodgates to a reshaped strategy behind 21st-century
politics in the face of a social media-dominated era. Subsequently, we can see how this
developing political strategy has fueled a growing divide between the two major political parties
— the Republicans and the Democrats. This divide is continuously exacerbated by the media
Jeffrey Gottfried and Elisa shearer, “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016, ” Pew Research Center’s
Journalism Project, December 27, 2017,
https://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/.
3
David Shimer, Rigged : America, Russia, and One Hundred Years of Covert Electoral Interference (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 246.
4
Aaron Smith, “The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008, ” Pew Research Center: Internet and Technology (Pew
Research Center, April 15, 2009),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2009/04/15/the-internets-role-in-campaign-2008/.
5
Ibid.
2
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titans of the industry, who flood the social media timelines of their users with subjective
opinion-driven articles that aggressively attack the opposing view.

Origins of Mass Media and Disinformation
While 21st-century technology platforms that have capabilities of reporting news have
become undoubtedly linked to politics during the rise of the ‘Information Age’, it is important
that we understand that manipulation of this decade’s long relationship between politics and
reporting has long been exploited by state-backed entities to promote disinformation campaigns
across domestic and international communities.6 Scholars often credit the origins of media
disinformation to the 15th century, with the creation of the Gutenberg Printing Press.7 By the
beginning of the 16th century, the church had begun to utilize this technology for mass
publication and by the beginning of the 17th century, the first widespread international
distribution of newspapers led by independent organizations was documented.8 Along with the
rapid spread of news came the uptick in demands for content and newspapers had begun to be
overrun with unverifiable stories that ranged from eye witness accounts on sea monsters and
witches to natural disasters and the church.9
Though there are centuries of documented disinformation campaigns throughout modern
history, this thesis focuses on the more recent cases of states utilizing disinformation as a means
to control public narrative and thought. While Germany fell under the rule of the Nazi Party
beginning in the early 19th century, Adolf Hitler had devised the concept of the Reich Ministry
“Definition of Information Age,” Merriam-webster.com (Merriam-Webster, 2019),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Information%20Age.
7
Marina Gorbis, “Our Gutenberg Moment (SSIR),” ssir.org (Stanford Social Innovation Review, March 17, 2017),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/our_gutenberg_moment.
8
History.com Editors, “Printing Press,” History.com (History.com, May 7, 2018),
https://www.history.com/topics/inventions/printing-press.
9
Jacob Soll, “The Long and Brutal History of Fake News,” POLITICO Magazine (POLITICO LLC, December 18,
2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-violent-214535.
6
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of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.10 With the help of this ministry, Hitler successfully
managed to control and manipulate all forms of state media.11 Concurrently, the Soviet Union
launched its very own disinformation office in 1923, which came at the request of Józef
Unszlicht, Deputy Chairman of the KGB.12 Under this initiative, the KGB was credited with the
creation of the word dezinformatsiya which we have come to know as disinformation. 13

Subsequently, in the decades following, the People’s Republic of China underwent the Cultural
Revolution under Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party of China, which aimed to
erase the “four olds” or the concepts of old ideas, old things, old customs, and old habits.14 It was
under this jarring transition that the People’s Republic of China began an internal campaign on
rewriting its past so that it could begin to alter the narrative of its future.
While the scale of disinformation seen within the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election may be
alarming to the government of the United States and its citizens, historical context utilization
allows us to better understand the severity of recent events in relation to the century’s old
phenomenon. But most importantly, let this serve as a reminder to reflect upon the past with the
intent of better understanding how to predict the future, so that we may continue to safeguard the
long-lasting prosperity of our democracy and our great nation as we proceed to enter into the
unknown.

10

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, “Ministry of Propaganda and Public
Enlightenment,” Ushmm.org (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2019),
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/ministry-of-propaganda-and-public-enlightenment.
11
Ibid.
12
Martin J Manning, Herbert Romerstein, and Martin Manning, Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda, ed.
James Olson (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 83.
13
Ibid.
14
Tillman Durdin, “China Transformed by Elimination of ‘Four Olds’’,’” The New York Times, March 19, 1971,
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/19/archives/china-transformed-by-elimination-of-four-olds.html.

7

Focus of Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the threat posed by an increase in offensive
disinformation campaigns by Russia and China which aim to destabilize the international
community and negatively influence domestic politics in the United States. This thesis provides
information regarding the domestic systems that enable both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to
exercise control over mass media with the goal of rewriting the narrative of current events to
better advance their personal agendas. Through the use of publicly available information, this
study will bring to light the growing 21st-century threat while offering suggestions for how the
United States can best proceed in effectively combating it under the Presidency of
President-elect Joe Biden.

8

Russian Disinformation Efforts
“We will never know whether the Russian intervention was determinative in such a close
election. ... What does matter is this: The Russians successfully meddled in our democracy and
our intelligence agencies have concluded they will do so again.”15
- Democratic Representative Adam Schiff

Origins of State-Backed Meddling
To better understand the events that have recently unfolded in the 2016 U.S. Presidential
Election, I will begin by isolating the effects of disinformation as fueled only by the Kremlin.
Reflecting on events prior to 2016, it is worth noting that Russia underwent its own 2012
Presidential election and for the first time the international community saw Vladimir Putin
reportedly adopt an aggressive “trolling” campaign against his political opponents in the months
leading up to the election.16 This was a never before seen offensive strategy aimed at utilizing
“trolls,” or Kremlin-backed accounts, on various social media platforms to persuade voters
through consistent exposure to state-funded smear campaigns that aimed to delegitimize Putin’s
opponent, Gennady Zyuganov.17 It was through this successful experimentation that the Kremlin
had realized that the previous strategy of attempting to influence political leaders within the
United States through mass “phishing” attempts as reported in the years prior to the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election was far less effective than utilizing Kremlin-funded “bots” and “trolls” to

Reuters Staff, “Key Quotes from Congress’ Hearing on Russia and the U.S. Election,” Reuters, March 20, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-factbox/key-quotes-from-congress-hearing-on-russia-and-the-us-election-idUSKBN16R229.
16
Select Committee on Intelligence - United States Senate, “SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN
THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION,” United States Senate - Intelligence, vol. Volume 2: RUSSIA’S USE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS (Washington D.C.: United States Senate, 2019),
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf.
17
Ibid.
15
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target and influence American voters.18 It was through Putin’s domestic efforts, that the Kremlin
was able to adopt a more technically advanced playbook as it narrowed its focus on the
upcoming U.S. election.

Russia and the 2016 Election
And as the 2016 U.S. presidential election took shape, we witnessed a growing domestic
divide among American voters on certain key topics such as immigration policy, oppression
against minorities, and second amendment rights. This divide was only fueled by a growing
vocalization of extreme political views that countered the opposing party’s ideology. These
polarized posts had higher user interaction rates since they were being circulated by users more
often, thus making them appear in the social media algorithm as more popular because of users
supporting or objecting to the extreme content within the post.19 We later learned that platforms
such as Facebook then implemented the practice of data mining to analyze and build refined
profiles of each user based on how they would interact with the content.20 This allowed artificial
intelligence to feed certain posts to the user based on their unique data metric profiles.21 It did not
take long for private companies and international adversaries to exploit the opportunity to use the
data profiles gathered on millions of Facebook users and start feeding information into these

Marie Baezner and Robin Patrice, “Hotspot Analysis: Cyber-Conflict between the United States of America and
Russia (Volume 1),” Center for Security Studies (CSS) (Zürich: ETH Zürich, June 2017),
https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2017-0
2.pdf.
19
Ivan Garibay et al., “Polarization in Social Media Assists Influencers to Become More Influential: Analysis and
Two Inoculation Strategies,” Scientific Reports 9, no. 1 (December 9, 2019): 1–9,
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-55178-8.
20
Natasha Singer, “What You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses Your Data,” The New York Times, April 11,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html.
21
Ibid.
18
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polarized “echo chambers,” or like-minded communities that strategically filter opposing views
through an algorithm.22
As reported by the Senate Committee on Intelligence’s second report on Russian campaign
interference in 2016, the digital advertising expenses for the 2016 election increased by 789
percent or $1.4 billion over what had been reported in the 2012 election.23 With greater insight
into the behavioral data on countless social media users, not only did political candidates identify
an opportunity to advance their unique narratives with the hopes of being elected, but Russia’s
Internet Research Agency (IRA) also tapped into this information to target voters in an attempt
to discredit candidates at multiple levels on both sides if they opposed the Kremlin.24
The Kremlin in doing this had identified a critical flaw that tech giants could not mitigate
and it proved to be an unanticipated threat. As social media became further politicized and used
by voters for accessing news leading up to the 2016 election, it has exposed a vulnerability that
allowed the once free flow of information between Americans to become manipulated and
diluted by those with ill intent in the broader international community.25 This paved way for a
newfound tactic within the art of psychological warfare. As Christopher Wylie, a former
Cambridge Analytica employee explained, “If you’re trying to hack a person’s mind, you need to
identify cognitive biases and then exploit them.”26 The Kremlin would prove to do just that by
introducing a new form of hybrid warfare.

Kartik Hosanagar, “Blame the Echo Chamber on Facebook. But Blame Yourself, Too,” WIRED (WIRED,
November 25, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/facebook-echo-chamber/.
23
Select Committee on Intelligence - United States Senate, “SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN
THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION,” United States Senate - Intelligence, vol. Volume 2: RUSSIA’S USE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS (Washington D.C.: United States Senate, 2019),
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Christopher Wylie, MINDF*CK : Cambridge Analytica and the Plot to Break America. (S.L.: Random House,
2019).
22
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The Design of Russian Disinformation Entities
To adopt and successfully implement this strategy of hybrid warfare, the Kremlin undertook
a two-pronged approach to influence the 2016 election. It focused the first prong on the
utilization of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), and the second prong relied on the aggressive
execution by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) cyber units. The IRA
based out of St. Petersburg had developed a broad “information warfare” strategy as early as
2014, but this strategy had shifted to support President Trump in the months leading up to the
election.27 The GRU is the foreign military intelligence agency that reports directly to the
Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff.28 Under the operations of the GRU in
2016 were Units 26165 and 74455, which were cyber operations units that directly targeted the
computer networks of the presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton.29 Through these coordinated
efforts, the GRU had successfully accessed private information and leaked sensitive information
that attacked the legitimacy of Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election.30

Early Signs of a Growing Russian Threat
It is important to note that the offensive cyber operations of the GRU had coincided with
various meetings between the Russian government and Trump Campaign officials.31 While there
was no substantial evidence that could have established that the Trump Campaign conspired or
Robert Mueller III, “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election
(Vol. 1),” U.S. Department of Justice Storage (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.
28
Guy Faulconbridge, “What Is Russia’s GRU Military Intelligence Agency?,” Reuters (Reuters, October 5, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-gru-factbox/what-is-russias-gru-military-intelligence-agency-idUS
KCN1MF1VK.
29
Robert Mueller III, “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election
(Vol. 1),” U.S. Department of Justice Storage (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
27
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coordinated with the Russian government in the state-sponsored actions aimed at disrupting the
2016 election, it is worth noting that the Kremlin had a clear bias in favor of Donald Trump
which dated back to as early as 2015.32 This begs the question of whether the Kremlin had an
authentic existing respect towards President Trump or if the Kremlin had early on identified an
opportunity to utilize the controversial relationship with President Trump to further sow discord
among the American people.
Before 2016, the United States had been aware of a growing cyber threat from opposing
powers such as Russia. As noted within the Director of National Intelligence’s 2015 Worldwide
Threat Assessment, the United States knew that Russia was gaining confidence in utilizing
information warfare to combat the spread of democratic ideology and influence in the
international community as top officials saw in Ukraine.33 However, the United States did not
adequately prepare for the sophisticated disinformation capabilities of the Russian state, which
primarily targeted the American voters rather than the infrastructure of the polls or networks of
politicians. Sources report that as early as 2014, the Obama administration had received
preemptive warning about a growing threat posed by the growing offensive capabilities of the
Kremlin, however, the State Department feared the potential retaliation that would follow from
taking a more aggressive counter to the growing threats.34 A former official of the Obama
administration noted that there were several options under consideration to convey a strong
message of condemnation to the Kremlin.35 However, these options failed to be further pursued

Ibid.
James R Clapper, “Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community
Senate Armed Services Committee,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Washington D.C.: Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, 2015),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf.
34
Ali Watkins, “Obama Team Was Warned in 2014 about Russian Interference,” POLITICO (POLITICO LLC,
August 14, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/14/obama-russia-election-interference-241547.
35
Ibid.
32
33
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out of fear for the safety of diplomatic staff and defense attaches rather than the intelligence
operatives who would be carrying out a majority of the proposed actions.36

The Aftermath of 2016
While the extent to which the Kremlin meddled in the 2016 United States presidential
election can not be decisively quantified, it can be confidently argued that there was significant
meddling within the electoral process. For example, “In 2016, Russian agents posted just under
30,000 times on Facebook, yet the operation generated almost 13 million shares, 15 million likes,
and 1.3 million comments, according to a research team at Oxford University.”37 And they
displayed disinformation material directly on the Facebook timelines of over one-third of the
U.S. population or 126 million users, according to the testimony by Facebook’s general
counsel.38 Additionally, Twitter reported, “that in the 10 weeks before the election some 3,814
Internet Research Agency accounts interacted with 1.4 million people,” and an additional 50,528
automated bot accounts had tweeted regarding the election which could have reached an even
broader audience.39 It is important to keep in mind that the above statistics are limited to the
reach of disinformation on Facebook and Twitter, and evidence suggests that the Kremlin
launched similar campaigns across various other platforms such as Instagram and YouTube.

Ibid.
Philip Elliott, “The Mueller Report Doesn’t Call Into Question Trump’s 2016 Win,” Time (TIME USA, April 18,
2019), https://time.com/5573537/mueller-report-russia-election-interference/.
38
Elizabeth Weise, “Russian Fake Accounts Showed Posts to 126 Million Facebook Users,” USA TODAY (USA
TODAY, October 30, 2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/10/30/russian-fake-accounts-showed-posts-126-million-facebook-users/8
15342001/.
39
Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far (Published
2018),” The New York Times, September 20, 2018, sec. U.S.,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html?mtrref=
www.google.com.
36
37
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However, the Kremlin’s support of international disinformation campaigns has not stopped
at the 2016 presidential election. The Department of Justice continues to unravel various pieces
of evidence that point towards a continuation of these campaigns, despite several notable
indictments of Russian nationals and Russian entities.
In 2018, the Department of Justice indicted Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, a Russian
national charged with aiding a possibly state-backed aggressive disinformation media campaign
during the 2016 presidential elections and beyond. This became officially known as “Project
Lakhta”.40 It is important to note that Elena Khusyaynova had received funding from Yevgeniy
Viktorovich Prigozhin, a close ally of Vladimir Putin, who funded the infamous Internet
Research Agency (IRA).41 It is noted by Yevgeny Vyshenkov, an affiliate of Prigozhin that,
“Yevgeny Prigozhin believes he is the Czar’s right hand.”42 Within the official complaint, the
Department of Justice provides evidence for continued social media influence between
December 2016 and May 2018.43 The evidence shows several attempts by the conspirators to
target radical groups through social media campaigns that manipulated the narratives of various
societal topics within the United States.44
In order to lend credibility to the conspirators who aimed to target American social media
users, the conspirators behind Project Lakhta had covertly adopted falsified personas of

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. ELENA
ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28,
2018).
41
Amanda Macias and Mike Calia, “Trump Administration Sanctions ‘Putin’s Chef,’ Other Russians over 2016
Election Hacking,” CNBC (CNBC LLC, March 15, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/15/treasury-sanctions-putins-chef-other-russians-over-cyber-related-threats.html.
42
Thomas Grove, “Kremlin Caterer Accused in U.S. Election Meddling Has History of Dishing Dark Arts,” Wall
Street Journal, February 16, 2018, sec. US,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kremlin-caterer-accused-in-u-s-election-meddling-has-history-of-dishing-dark-arts-15
18823765.
43
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. ELENA
ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28,
2018).
44
Ibid.
40
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American activists.45 It was through these accounts that conspirators had utilized advanced
analytic products to target users with aggressive social media advertising campaigns.46 The
intricacy behind Project Lakhta went as far as to acquire U.S. based computer network space in
order to utilize virtual private networks (VPN’s) that would allow for the specialists to access the
U.S. network from anywhere in the world.47 The funds required to launch such a large scale
offensive campaign were managed by Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, who sat at the center of
this particular Department of Justice led investigation and indictment.48 The evidence suggests
that Khusyaynova requested the necessary funds for Project Lakhta from Concord Management
and Consulting, an organization owned by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin.49 It was through
these requests that Concord affiliates wired vague or misrepresented funds directly to
Khusyaynova for Project Lakhta.50
The U.S. Department of Justice had earlier indicted Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin on 16
February 2018 under the rule of a grand jury for his involvement with Project Lakhta and

Ibid.
Ibid.
47
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. INTERNET
RESEARCH AGENCY LLC * A/K/A MEDIASINTEZ LLC A/K/A * GLAVSET LLC A/K/A MIXINFO * LLC
A/K/A AZIMUT LLC A/K/A * NOVINFO LLC, * CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND * CONSULTING LLC, *
CONCORD CATERING, * YEVGENIY VIKTOROVICH * PRIGOZHIN, * MIKHAIL IVANOVICH
BYSTROV, * MIKHAIL LEONIDOVICH BURCHIK * A/K/A MIKHAIL ABRAMOV, * ALEKSANDRA
YURYEVNA * KRYLOVA, * ANNA VLADISLAVOVNA * BOGACHEV A, * SERGEY PAVLOVICH
POLOZOV, * MARIA ANATOLYEVNA BOVDA * A/K/A MARIA ANATOLYEVNA * BELYAEVA, *
ROBERT SERGEYEVICH BOVDA, * DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY * ASLANOV A/K/A JAYHOON *
ASLANOV A/K/A JAY ASLANOV, * VADIM VLADIMIROVICH * PODKOPAEV, * GLEB IGOREVICH
VASILCHENKO, * IRINA VIKTOROVNA KAVERZINA, * and * VLADIMIR VENKOV. (United States District
Court for the District of Columbia February 16, 2018).
48
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. ELENA
ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28,
2018).
49
Neil MacFarquhar, “Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is Known as ‘Putin’s Cook,’” The
New York Times, February 16, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/world/europe/prigozhin-russia-indictment-mueller.html.
50
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. ELENA
ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28,
2018).
45
46
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Concord Management and Consulting.51 The evidence obtained by the Department of Justice
shows that by 2016, Concord Management and Consulting was funding the operating expenses
of Project Lakhta with a monthly budget of over 1,250,000 U.S. Dollars.52 These funds fueled the
rapid circulation of disinformation across American social media platforms, such as Facebook
and Twitter, with ease. However, despite his indictment, Prigozhin remains an unmanaged threat
and resides within the borders of Russia.

President Trump’s Response to Russia
As the U.S. Department of Justice continues to utilize evidence from the U.S. Intelligence
Community that links offensive acts carried out on behalf of Russian agents, oligarchs, and
officials, Vladimir Putin vehemently has condemned on multiple occasions the claim of Russian
interference in the 2016 election. During an interview with Fox News anchor Chirs Wallace,
Putin stated, “Do you really believe that someone acting from the Russian territory could have
influenced the United States and influenced the choice of millions of Americans? This is utterly
ridiculous.”53 The consistent denial of involvement by Putin has only been supported by the
remarks of President Trump, as seen during a moderated discussion in Helsinki, Finland when
the President states, “My people came to me — Dan Coats came to me and some others — they
51
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said they think it’s Russia. I have President Putin; he just said it’s not Russia. I will say this: I
don’t see any reason why it would be…”.54 These remarks provide a harsh contrast to the
consistent stance of the U.S. Intelligence Community and undoubtedly has led to the creation of
tension between the President, his security advisers, and the American people.
However, after an outcry by Democratic Party leaders for a lack of response by President
Trump for Russian interference during the 2016 election, in March of 2018, the Treasury
Department had placed sanctions on 24 Russian entities and individuals.55 However, critics of the
President remained upset by the failure to acknowledge Russian interference in 2016. Chuck
Schumer, Senate minority leader, was quoted saying, “I say to President Trump, your silence
speaks on this issue.”56

Russian Efforts Ahead of the 2020 Election
Given the lack of direct repercussions imposed on Russia for its attempt to influence the
2016 election, many expected to see the Kremlin display a willingness to further push the limits
of what the U.S. government will tolerate. Beginning in February of 2018, Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson provided a warning on early-stage Russian interference within the upcoming midterm
elections.57 In July of 2018, Microsoft went public with evidence showing Russian hackers had
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attempted to launch a phishing page that targeted three congressional candidates.58 And in
December of 2018, Dan Coats, the Director of National Intelligence, conducted an investigation
that concluded that Russia, alongside China and Iran, had successfully conducted influence
campaigns during the 2018 midterm elections.59 The actions taken by the Kremlin during the
midterm elections were similar tactics to those of the 2016 election in terms of the
disinformation strategy implemented across social media platforms.
More recently, there has been evidence that suggests that the IRA, which is linked to
Yevgeny Prigozhin, remains active ahead of the 2020 Presidential election. Upon receiving a tip
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Facebook and Twitter uncovered several fake accounts
that were directing users to a news site by the name of Peace Data, which was fed by Russian
disinformation efforts.60 However, this time the Russians had contracted out unwitting freelance
American writers to create the news articles which were being published.61 While this attempt
was intercepted by the U.S. government early on, it shows that the Kremlin has adopted a new
approach to disinformation and it is attempting to direct social media users to state-backed
“fringe websites” rather than solely relying on traditional social media posts.62 This proves that
the threat of disinformation is continuing to evolve and further suggests the need for enhanced
preventive measures to combat any offensive actions taken by a foreign adversary, such as
Russia, prior to the 2020 election.
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In months leading up to the 2020 election, however, a whistleblower complaint by Brian
Murphy, the former head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at DHS, disclosed on several
occasions that there was attempted censorship of intelligence analysis relating to the Russian
interference efforts.63 Murphy outlines an instance in which David Glawe, the Special Assistant
to the President and Senior Director for Homeland Security, had testified in 2018 on the matter
to the House Committee on Homeland Security, but was then summoned to the White House and
threatened to be fired by Secretary Nielsen at the orders of President Trump.64 However, Glawe
had managed to restore relations and return to his role but conveyed to Murphy that he would no
longer be assisting him in matters that regard to Russian interference assessments.65
In May 2020, Chad Wolf, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, was notified by
Robert O’Brien, White House National Security Advisor, to have Brian Murphy shift his efforts
from reporting on Russian interference to interference by China and Iran.66 However, after
continuing to report on Russian disinformation, Murphy was told by Wolf in a closed-door
meeting to hold back further reports as this topic “made the President look bad”.67 Afterward,
Murphy asserts that he was excluded from future briefings and a leaked analysis allegedly
misreported intelligence and downplayed the current threat presented by Russia ahead of the
election.68
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Conclusion
As the United States 2020 presidential election is underway, the public is now aware of the
existing disinformation and cyber threat capabilities of opposing superpowers such as Russia and
China. However, many remain skeptical of our preparedness given the postponement of the
Director of National Intelligence’s Worldwide Threat Assessment, which typically outlines
high-level initiatives and assessments set forth by the U.S. Intelligence Community. To
complicate any preexisting threat of foreign adversaries targeting the 2020 United States
presidential election, we are now working to combat an unprecedented global pandemic
stemming from the virus, COVID-19.
Since the conclusion of the 2016 presidential election, we have undoubtedly experienced the
continuation of an advancing polarization between the two major political parties and their
followers within the United States. And this growing divide has only been amplified by the rise
of the ‘Information Age’ and the growing user interaction across all major social media
platforms.69 As we continue to see an upward trend in the percentage of Americans who turn to
social media to formulate their views and voice their opinions, are we willingly serving as
accomplices in our adversaries’ pursuit to delegitimize the western democratic system?
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Chinese Disinformation Efforts
“They’re calculating. They’re persistent. They’re patient. And they’re not subject to the
righteous constraints of an open, democratic society or the rule of law.”70
-

Christopher Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Origins of State-Backed Meddling
The increase in disinformation campaigns can not be solely attributed to the Russian
government, as we have recently begun to see the Chinese government follow suit in particular
since 2016. Reflecting on the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is important to
note that the Chinese government has been controlled by the Chinese Community Party (CCP)
since its creation in 1949.71 Since then, the state has clearly placed its focus on establishing a
firm hold over three main pillars: “control of personnel, propaganda, and the People’s Liberation
Army”.72 While the significant efforts directed towards controlling these three pillars have
shaped the day-to-day functionality of the Chinese domestic politics, it has arguably distorted the
party’s view on how to effectively cultivate respect in the international community. However,
can the party’s long-standing domestic agenda be solely to blame for what appears to be
increasingly aggressive offensive actions taken in the international community on behalf of the
Chinese state?
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China’s Growing Admiration Towards Russia
Over the course of the past five years, we have seen evidence that suggests a growing
willingness of the Chinese government to exert overt and covert influence over territories that
share a special relationship with the mainland, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. Leading up to
these questionable cases there has been both a rise in Russian disinformation campaigns and
information warfare toward the Western world and a continued rapid development in relations
between the Russian government and the Chinese government. As noted by Chinese President,
Xi Jinping, ahead of a visit to Russia in July of 2019, “I have had closer interactions with
President Putin than with any other foreign colleagues. He is my best and bosom friend. I cherish
dearly our deep friendship."73 Recently, the two countries have conducted several joint military
training exercises with the most recent taking place in September of 2020 in southern Russia, just
weeks before the U.S. Presidential Election and during the midst of the growing global
pandemic.74 The strengthening of the Chinese and Russian relationship has brought about several
notable concerns from political figures and academics alike, which can be captured by the
remarks of Thomas Joscelyn of the Foundation for Defense of Democracy, “the Xi-Putin
partnership is arguably the most dangerous relationship on the planet today.”75
While at first glance it may appear that these two countries are focused on two different
political agendas which could possibly limit a future need for international cooperation between
the two states, this is not necessarily the case. If we draw our attention to the aspirations of these
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two superpowers when it comes to 21st-century foreign affairs, we can identify a mutual desire
to diminish the standing of the United States in hopes of restoring the previously held respect
among their given geopolitical spheres of influence. As identified within the Secretary of
Defense’s annual report to Congress on the military and security developments of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC’s), it is stated that PRC has set forth a strategy that is focused on “the
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049.76 One of the ways that the state has recently
evolved to achieve this ambitious goal is by the adoption and aggressive implementation of a
“sharp power” approach, a term which has been coined by the National Endowment for
Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies.77 This term can be defined as, “an
approach to international affairs that typically involves efforts at censorship and the use of
manipulation to degrade the integrity of independent institutions.”78 While the CPP has managed
to assert its influence over the flow of information domestically, it now seeks to aggressively
expand its state-led censorship and manipulative disinformation capabilities to the international
community, similar to Russia. In doing so, the CCP aims to condition the minds of foreign
entities into accepting the altered narrative that originates from the party leadership in Beijing.79
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With control over the foreign perspective and the financial means to influence global markets,
the PRC has begun to establish itself as a global leader.80
However, the PRC realizes that in order to advance its desired standing within the
international community, it must further destabilize the country that is currently limiting its
ability to be seen as the top superpower, the United States. And in the year of a growing global
pandemic and the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election, China has proven eager to jump at the
opportunity to further expose an existing domestic vulnerability among the American people
with the hopes of discrediting Western democracy, similar to Russia. However, the CCP’s
approach differs from that of the Kremlin, as the U.S. Office of the Director of National
Intelligence has identified that China prefers the election of Democratic nominee and former
Vice President Joe Biden, who offers a chance at moderating current Trump-backed criticisms
against the PRC.81 While the CCP has made its presidential preferences clear, it can be argued
that the PRC benefits from launching disinformation campaigns in support of, or against, both
sides.82 As stated by a notable Chinese-American, Pastor Bob Fu, who recently has found
himself facing death threats from supporters of the CCP, “With such a large-scale disinformation
campaign, you don’t really have to think of this as beneficial to either candidate. The information
operation is meant to cause confusion and chaos for the American electorate and hurt both
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sides.”83 If this is indeed representative of the CCP’s strategy, it displays Beijing's
forward-thinking in shaping the future of great power politics.84

China’s Disinformation Entities
In order to best understand the forms in which the PRC is implementing its sharp power
approach, it is important to understand the state-backed entities that serve as the driving force
behind domestic and international information campaigns. Similar to the Russian military's Main
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), the PRC has established the People’s
Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF holds the Network Systems
Department which is largely responsible for the PRC’s “cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance,
electronic warfare, and psychological warfare” operations carried out against foreign entities.85 It
is worth noting that the SSF is the only known psychological warfare focused entity within the
People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA).86 With this knowledge, the U.S. Department of Defense has
defined the intent of the PLA’s psychological operations mission as one that aims to disrupt and
influence the public narrative of the international community with the intent of advancing the
interests of the PRC.87
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China and the Fight to Control Hong Kong
Considering the recent events that have taken place in Hong Kong in mid to late 2019, there
is an apparent state-sponsored suppression of the citizens’ and reporters’ voices across several
virtual domains. The unrest in Hong Kong began in June of 2019 as plans of an extradition bill
came to light, which would allow for citizens of Hong Kong to be extradited to mainland China
for legal prosecution.88 Protesters feared that this would give China the ability to assert control
over a semi-autonomous territory, which is currently identified as the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the PRC.89 Following July 1, 1997, China was once again
granted sovereignty over Hong Kong by the British after the signing of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong.90 However, in return for the PRC’s resumed
sovereignty over Hong Kong, the PRC agreed to abide by the Basic Law which outlines the
concept of ‘one country, two systems’ and provides a constitutional framework to preserve the
freedoms of Hong Kong’s governing body and its people.91 However, in light of recent events,
the people of Hong Kong feel that the mainland is trying to exercise unlawful influence over its
unique system.
These fears had motivated hundreds of thousands of citizens to take to the streets of Hong
Kong. After weeks of unrest, Hong Kong’s legislature had decided to officially withdraw the
highly debated extradition bill.92 However, citizens continued to take to the streets with the “five
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demands, not one less” campaign that aimed to promote further pro-democratic reform within the
HKSAR.93 After several violent clashes between protesters and law enforcement, Yang Guang, a
spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the Chinese government, promoted
the protestors as “brazen, violent and criminal actors”.94 Which was then followed by an implicit
verbal warning from Beijing that urged protestors to not underestimate the strength and power of
the central government.95
With the hopes of controlling the narrative of events unfolding in the HKSAR, the PRC
took an aggressive two-pronged disinformation approach that aimed to control the way in which
the citizens within mainland China and the international community perceived the ongoing
events. When it came time to execute this particular disinformation campaign domestically, it
was executed with ease due to the fact that the party has blocked access to Twitter, Facebook,
and Google for the mainland citizens of the PRC.96 Consequently, the citizens are limited to the
news that is shared on the state-backed platforms, Weibo, which is supposed to replicate a more
censored version of Twitter, and WeChat, which is aimed at replicating a popularized Facebook
application by the name of WhatsApp.97 It is through these platforms that the CPP managed to
launch several campaigns that villainized the HKSAR protestors and projected them as radical
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separatists who aimed to degrade the unity of the PRC.98 One of the more notable discussion
threads on Weibo was titled “Protect Hong Kong, firmly say no to violence” and this thread
managed to accumulate over one million comments that largely backed state intervention against
protestors in the HKSAR.99
However, the PRC aimed to control narrative beyond the state and in order to accomplish
this, it became clear that these disinformation campaigns would have to be replicated across
Western social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook. After careful investigation,
Twitter had reported in an official statement that it had suspended approximately 200,000
accounts that, “ … were deliberately and specifically attempting to sow political discord in Hong
Kong, including undermining the legitimacy… of the protest on the ground.”100 Of these
approximately 200,000 Twitter accounts, a minimum of 936 of them had originated from the
PRC and others likely accessed the platform through VPNs.101 Additionally, Facebook had
reported in an official statement that it had removed 5 Facebook accounts, 3 Facebook Groups,
and 7 Facebook Pages from the platform due to the posting of disinformation on matters relating
to Hong Kong and origins that traced back to PRC government officials.102 Facebook estimates
that these Facebook Pages had roughly a combined total of 15,000 followers and that the
Facebook Groups had a combined total of 2,200 joiners.103
In one final push to control the narrative stemming from events in Hong Kong, the top
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which outlined new guidance for the interpretation and punishments of crimes that can be
classified under “secession”, “subversion”, “terrorism” and “collusion with foreign forces.”104
The new national security law placed on the HKSAR comes at a time of uncertainty as clashes
between protestors and state police forces continue to rage on in the city.105 In the eyes of Jeff
Wasserstrom, a historian of modern China at the University of California, Irvine, this move
further endangers the sovereignty of the territory, as police forces have been presented with an
even greater degree of autonomy to move forward with unlawful arrests of those who speak out
against the PRC and CPP.106 Consequently, it can be predicted that this will only further limit the
freedom of speech of citizens across verbal and electronic mediums due to an increased fear of
repercussion for voicing personal views. In response to the passing of this legislation, President
Trump signed Executive Order 13936 which authorized the U.S. Government to impose
sanctions on those responsible within PRC for passing the national security law, as this act has
been perceived as a threat to the autonomy of the HKSAR and the national security of the United
States.107

Chinese Disinformation During a Global Pandemic
The widespread disinformation campaigns as seen within the cases of Hong Kong
(HKSAR) and Taiwan serve as an alarming glimpse into the advancing capabilities of the PRC
and arguably offer a grim warning to those who sit in the crosshairs of the party, such as the
United States. As we find ourselves amidst a growing global pandemic, we have seen the rapid
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degradation of international relations, with respect to China, due to a lack of transparency and
truth surrounding the origins and reporting of COVID-19.108
Beginning in December, several Chinese doctors had begun to notice a strange occurrence
of a virus that appeared similar to the earlier outbreak of the SARS-coronavirus epidemic, one of
which was Doctor Li Wenliang.109 As Dr. Li’s worries began to grow, he attempted to share
precautionary measures with fellow medical professionals.110 However, as word of this reached
government officials, an official investigation was launched and Dr. Li was forced to sign a note
that urged him to stop spreading false claims with an explicit threat of legal repercussion if these
demands were not immediately enacted.111 After several weeks, Dr. Li had fallen ill and passed
away from complications caused by COVID-19, the virus that he had originally identified weeks
prior.112 However, prior to his unfortunate passing, Dr. Li had taken to the Chinese social media
platform, Weibo, to share his story and further prove that the CCP had falsely denied any spread
of infection across its state-monitored media platforms.113
Additionally, in January of 2020, China purposely withheld and prohibited the disclosure of
data pertaining to COVID-19 to the World Health Organization (WHO) and instead held an
abundance of closed door political meetings.114 Dr. Gauden Galea, the WHO’s highest-ranking
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official in China, reported that “… they’re [the Chinese Government] giving it to us 15 minutes
before it appears on CCTV.”115
And after weeks of developing widespread cases of COVID-19, a top Chinese official, and
Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian had made the first notable attempt at deflecting
responsibility for COVID-19’s proven origins in Wuhan, China.116 Within a tweet, Zhao Lijian,
had raised suspicion to his more than 300,000 followers that the virus may have been brought
into China from a U.S. Soldier.117 These false claims were quickly followed by an aggressive
push back by President Trump, who notably referred to COVID-19 as the ‘Chinese virus’ across
several press briefings and tweets.118 However, the efforts to rewrite the narrative of pandemic
proved to be more widespread than the theory promoted by Zhao Lijian, as they continued to
unfold. The Chinese government has chosen to clearly follow the Russian strategy of
disinformation by attempting to confuse the general public by promoting differing theories
across social media platforms and by utilizing state-backed accounts and figures to promote
these messages to hundreds of thousands of users across the world.119
Beginning in late 2018, there had been only 17 official Chinese diplomatic Twitter accounts
across the platform but as of early 2020, there had been a sudden 370% growth in this number,
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marking over 80 official Chinese diplomatic accounts on the platform.120 Evidence suggests that
there could be a correlation in this sudden sharp growth to a meeting held on February 3rd, 2020
by Chinese President, Xi Jinping.121 It had been reported that one of the major talking points
within this meeting focused on crafting a strategy for publicizing a narrative that highlighted the
state’s unity in the face of the growing pandemic.122 In the months following this meeting,
Twitter experienced a surge in accounts that aimed to spread pro-Chinese disinformation across
the platform and this consequently led to an investigation that successfully identified over 23,750
highly engaged state-backed accounts that were responsible for collectively tweeting 348,608
times.123
Additionally, U.S. officials have recently grown aware that the PRC has unforeseen
capabilities that allow for its reach to expand beyond the means of social media as frequently
seen in past years.124 During the early onset of the pandemic, the U.S. Intelligence Community
had successfully identified that PRC operatives were behind an SMS disinformation campaign.125
This campaign targeted a large population of the American public with exaggerated messages of
a potential nationwide lockdown that would be enforced by the U.S. military.126 While the exact
reach of this campaign remains unreported, it appeared to be widespread enough to invoke a
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statement refuting the false claims by the White House National Security Council via Twitter on
March 15, 2020.127
As clearly stated by Xu Zhangrun, a law professor in Beijing, “The coronavirus epidemic
has revealed the rotten core of Chinese governance.”128 The paper which outlines the criticism of
the party posed by Xu, has since been banned but continues to circulate around the state through
back-channel means.129 Additionally, the disinformation surrounding the origins of COVID-19
has led more and more political scholars to grow increasingly skeptical over the means by which
the Xi regime presides over the Chinese people, with most supporting the harsh criticisms of the
party for recent actions and injustices.130 As stated by Shadi Hamid, a contributing writer at The
Atlantic, “… this pandemic should, finally, disabuse us of any remaining hope that the Chinese
regime could be a responsible global actor. It is not, and it will not become one.”131

China’s Growing Focus on American Politics
Concurrently, as the international community faces growing uncertainty surrounding
COVID-19, it is believed that the risk of foreign interference in the 2020 U.S. Presidential
election remains heightened. And as the U.S. approached the 100-day countdown leading up to
November 3rd, U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director, William
Evanina, issued a statement regarding the Intelligence Community’s commitment to updating the
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American people of any existing foreign threats ahead of election night.132 It was within this
statement that Director Evanina explicitly identified that the PRC has taken an invested interest
in shifting their disinformation efforts towards the American people in the months leading up to
the U.S. Presidential election.133 It was approximately three weeks later that Director Evanina
went on record once again to reaffirm the strong belief that, “China has been expanding its
influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States,
pressure political figures it views as opposed to China’s interests, and deflect and
counter-criticism of China.”134
Reports show that there have already been several attempts made to access information
and spread disinformation on behalf of the PRC, ahead of Election Day 2020. In early September
of 2020, Google released statements on a Chinese hackers’ attempt to access the personal email
accounts of the Biden Campaign on multiple levels.135 Later in the same month, Facebook wrote
in a blog post that it ceased the continuation of an early stage disinformation campaign launched
by the Chinese in an attempt to influence the political views of American citizens.136 While at the
current moment, evidence supporting this belief is limited due to the timing and the sensitive
nature of intelligence gathering efforts leading up to the 2020 Presidential election, it is

NCSC Director William Evanina, “Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: 100 Days Until Election
2020,” www.dni.gov (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, July 24, 2020),
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2135-statement-by-ncsc-director-william-evanina-100
-days-until-election-2020.
133
Ibid.
134
NCSC DIRECTOR WILLIAM EVANIA, “Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: Election Threat
Update for the American Public,” www.dni.gov (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 7, 2020),
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2139-statement-by-ncsc-director-william-evanina-ele
ction-threat-update-for-the-american-public.
135
David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “Chinese Hackers Target Email Accounts of Biden Campaign Staff, Google
Says,” The New York Times, June 4, 2020, sec. U.S.,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/us/politics/china-joe-biden-hackers.html.
136
Nathaniel Gleicher, “Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior,” Facebook.com (Facebook, September 22,
2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-china-philippines/.
132

35

imperative that we as a country identify the developing threat posed by the PRC and face it
head-on with the full support of the international community.
These beliefs have since been echoed by not only top U.S. Intelligence Officials but also
by the Intelligence Chief of the British Domestic Security Service (MI5), Ken McCallum.137 It
was during Chief McCallum’s first media briefing that he analyzed the Russian and Chinese
backed disinformation efforts as, “ … Russia was like bad weather but China [is] a far greater
challenge in the long-term and more like climate change.”138 While the level of threat posed by
the PRC may remain unclear, it is apparent that the narrative posed by the U.S. government has
appeared to be reciprocated by some of our notable allies across the globe, such as Britain.
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Conclusion — Evaluating Future Strategies
“To make progress, we must stop treating our opponents as our enemy. We are not enemies. We
are Americans.”139

-

President-elect Joe Biden

Overview of Analysis
Moving forward, I will assert that it is in the best interest of the United States government
and its citizens to act swiftly and decisively in combating the growing threat of disinformation
enabled by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. As we prepare to turn
over the United States Presidency to a new administration, under President-elect Joe Biden and
Vice President-elect Kamala Harris, I will consider proposals for President-elect Biden’s
Administration, proposals for national security advancement, and proposals for the private
sector. Given these areas of focus, I will proceed with providing a high-level proposal on how
each given functional area should focus its efforts in combating disinformation over the coming
years, with consideration to Russia and China.

Proposals for President-elect Biden’s Administration
As the Trump administration comes to an end and Americans prepare for the inauguration
of President-elect Joe Biden, the next four years will be critical in terms of the evolution of U.S.
relations with Russia and China. During the presidential campaign, President-elect Biden
referred to China’s President as “a thug” during the tenth Democratic Debate in Charleston,
South Carolina.140 Moreover, President-elect Biden remains fairly vocal about his disapproval of
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recent actions taken by Russian President Vladimir Putin in a variety of spaces from election
interference to failure to abide by the Open Skies Treaty.141 Though President-elect Biden has
agreed with President Trump’s decision to shift America’s focus from the Middle East to China
and Russia, he appears to hold back on his plan of action, Biden stated, “… there are a number of
other important priorities…”142
I suggest that President-elect Biden takes a hard stance on both China and Russia from the
very start of his time in office, in order to display a clear unwillingness to cooperate with states
that undermine the United States and its domestic politics. In regards to China, President Trump
waged a fairly intense trade war with the country that has accumulated over US$550 billion in
tariffs applied to Chinese goods.143 The tensions ignited by large tariff exchanges by both
countries began to deescalate in early 2020, with the signing of the Phase One Trade Deal.144
However, the consequential actions taken against Russia have been less direct in nature.
President Trump has shown a willingness to impose sanctions on Russia’s elite and to target
strategic military operations of the state but the President continues to delay other congressional
sanctions against Russia and avoid placing the blame on the state for aggressive acts in the
international community.145 With this in mind, President-elect Biden has the opportunity to enter
office with the intent of mending torn economic relations with China and implementing clearer
rhetoric that shows disapproval for Russia’s recent actions. However, to best execute this agenda
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of diplomacy, President-elect Biden will need to focus on improving America’s national security
resources and processes to safeguard the U.S. from any potential future offensive actions taken
by Russia or China during the course of this transition.

Proposals for National Security Advancements
With the public's growing concern over discerning factual news from foreign
disinformation aimed at obscuring their perceptions, it is necessary for the U.S. Government and
national security officials to begin increasing transparency and the rate in which they share
relevant information on this particular topic with the general public. For instance, there was the
unfavorable and lengthy delay of the 2020 Worldwide Threat Assessment to the House
Intelligence Committee from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).146 While
President Trump’s administration has remained silent on commenting on the topic, staffers have
remarked that the report will not be released for the foreseeable future.147 In the face of a highly
contested 2020 Presidential Election, the general public deserved to know the threats that were
prevalent especially with respect to foreign disinformation targeting American voters. The divide
within the flow of information between the federal government and the public must be
immediately amended, as people have the right to hear an overview of threats that affect their
daily interaction with news and information. Increased communication would only be beneficial
in restoring the public's trust in our government and the democratic process.
Additionally, the United States government must continue to be proactive in establishing
entities that can aid us to understand the threat of foreign disinformation and how we can
improve existing national security agencies' abilities to combat these threats. As we have seen
146
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recently, there have been recommendations for the development of a Social Media Data and
Threat Analysis Center under the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).148 The
development of a center, similar to that which is listed above, could prove invaluable in
increasing our nation’s cyber capabilities and would reinforce our commitment to combating the
threat of disinformation. As suggested by Steven Bradley in a PCIO Policy Proposal, our
government should look further into the formation of a federal commission that is responsible for
establishing, “… guidelines to govern content moderation efforts by social platform
operators…”149 The federal government and national security agencies should also increase
collaboration with the private sector in better managing the spread of disinformation
domestically.

Proposals for the Private Sector
In the months leading up to the U.S. Presidential Election, President-elect Biden did not
shy away from challenging the alleged lack of action taken when it comes to combating
disinformation by social media giant, Facebook.150 In a tweet, President-elect Biden called on his
supporters to electronically sign an open letter that was intended for the co-founder and Chief
Executive of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg.151 Within this letter, the Biden campaign coined the
hashtag #movefastfixit and outlined four key asks: “[to] promote real news, not fake news; [to]
quickly remove viral misinformation; [to] end the pre-election “lie” period; [and to] enforce
148
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voter suppression rules against everyone — even the President.”152 Additionally, the letter went
on to assert the Biden Campaign’s belief that Facebook was blindly making itself vulnerable to
disinformation campaigns launched by “foreign operatives” as seen in the 2016 election due to a
lack of preemptive action with only five months remaining before the 2020 election.153
However, one month prior to the election, Facebook stepped up and explicitly exercised its
ability to slow misinformation and disinformation on a large scale, when it managed to suppress
the further spread of a controversial New York Post article on Hunter Biden and a series of
alleged emails.154 Additionally, it is worth noting that Twitter had followed within Facebook’s
actions by also removing the content and citing its “Hacked Materials Policy”.155 Facebook went
on to credit the timely response to its third-party-fact-checking program which has been under
recent criticism as reports show that this entity had only reviewed 302 pieces of content in the
month of January 2020.156 While it proves to be a step in the right direction for combating this
growing threat, many still believe that the response was not adequate. According to digital rights
group Avaaz, the New York Post article still managed to receive 54,115,025 views and
2,164,601 interactions on Facebook.157
Moving forward, we should adopt the Center for American Progress’s proposed concept of
‘circuit breakers’ across our social media platforms.158 The purpose of this feature would be to
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aid in the filtering of possible disinformation by temporarily preventing the platform’s algorithm
to amplify the content in question.159 As we have learned, the Facebook algorithm is more likely
to suggest posts that appear to elicit a reaction, as it places an emphasis on showing posts that
have larger amounts of likes, comments, and reactions.160 With the assistance of this added
feature, these platforms could potentially scale back the rate at which users are exposed to the
content that is under review.161 Additionally, they could preemptive measures to warn users
about the accuracy of a given post and guide them to more reliable sources.162
Finally, I support the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s position that we have
reached a point where we must begin to give a thought as to how to properly foster open
discussions between our federal government and leading U.S. based social media companies.163
With respect to the data privacy concerns of users across these platforms, I suggest the
facilitation of publicly held discussions that aim to assess and design ways to share data with the
necessary government agencies to assist in monitoring foreign disinformation campaigns that
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threaten our national security and the credibility of our democracy.164 With the threat of foreign
disinformation increasing and the growth of our private sector similarly increasing, it is in the
best interest of the United States government to tap into existing resources developed by the
private sector to expedite the development of our federal defensive and offensive capabilities.

Closing Remarks
After reflecting on the three broad proposals for President-elect Biden and his
administration, I would like to bring our attention to the underlying message within these areas
of focus. Over the course of the past years, we have experienced a growing divide between the
White House, the defense sector, and the private sector. The effects of this divide have been felt
not only by our citizens but by the international community. This in return has made the U.S.
vulnerable. However, regardless of the presidential administration, it is necessary to recognize
that Russia and China are modernizing their offensive capabilities and agendas at an alarming
rate. In the future, it will be imperative for Biden to establish fluidity among these three major
areas of focus to defend against the growing threat of foreign disinformation that aims to
delegitimize our democracy and disband our national unity.
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